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In astro-ph/0702542, Linder and Miquel seek to criticize the use of Bayesian model selection for
data analysis and for survey forecasting and design. Their discussion is based on three serious mis-
understandings of the conceptual underpinnings and application of model-level Bayesian inference,
which invalidate all their main conclusions. Their paper includes numerous further inaccuracies,
including an erroneous calculation of the Bayesian Information Criterion. Here we seek to set the
record straight.
PACS numbers: 98.80.-k astro-ph/0703285
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper, Linder and Miquel [1] have mounted
a vigorous attack on the use of model selection tech-
niques in cosmology, particularly with regard to inter-
preting (forecasting) the outcome of (upcoming) surveys
and in survey design applications. They instead advocate
a frequentist parameter-fitting technique.
Our aim in this short note is to highlight important
misunderstandings that invalidate all the main conclu-
sions of their paper. In the process, we give a brief self-
contained discussion of the model selection framework;
for more details see e.g. Refs. [2, 3, 4]. In the Appendix
we highlight some specific inaccuracies in Ref. [1], many
of which are consequences of the general misunderstand-
ings outlined in the main body of this Comment.
II. WHAT IS BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION?
In Bayesian inference, model parameters are taken
as random variables, because this allows propagation of
the experimental measurement errors into self-consistent
probabilistic statements about parameter uncertainties.
The first step of Bayesian parameter estimation is the
choice of a model (Mi), which specifies a set of parame-
ters (~θi) to be varied in fitting to the data, along with a
set of prior probability ranges P (~θi|Mi) for those param-
eters. Given a particular set of data D, the likelihood
P (D|~θi,Mi) is used to update the prior probabilities to
the posterior
P (~θi|D,Mi) =
P (D|~θi,Mi)P (~θi|Mi)
P (D|Mi)
. (1)
The posterior P (~θi|D,Mi) contains all the information
about the state of knowledge on the parameters ~θi af-
ter the arrival of the data. From this one can construct
‘credible intervals’, i.e. ranges encompassing say 68% or
95% of posterior probability for the parameters.
We remark that Bayesian credible intervals have a pro-
foundly different meaning from frequentist confidence re-
gions, where model parameters are not random variables
but fixed unknown quantities. The fact that the two in-
tervals are formally equal in the case of a Gaussian like-
lihood (and flat priors, in the Bayesian scheme) is trace-
able to the symmetry between the measured mean and
the ‘true’ mean entering the Gaussian distribution. This
formal equivalence can engender considerable confusion
as to the different interpretations of the final result (for
a detailed discussion see Ref. [5]).
Bayesian model selection (or comparison) is the exten-
sion of the parameter estimation framework to include
multiple models, with different parameter vectors and
priors. Bayes theorem can be applied again to update a
prior model probability by the evidence, also known as
the marginal likelihood of the model, which is the nor-
malization constant in Eq. (1)
P (D|Mi) =
∫
P (D|~θi,Mi)P (~θi|Mi)d~θi . (2)
The evidence is the probability of the data given the
model. Bayes theorem is then used to obtain the proba-
bility of the model given the data,
P (Mi|D) ∝ P (D|Mi)P (Mi) , (3)
where P (Mi) is the prior model probability. It is clear
from the above equations that the evidence is the basis
of the model comparison and is built upon the parameter
estimation step.
All of the above is uncontroversial mathematics, pro-
viding a consistent and systematic inference system for
2evolving probabilities in light of experimental data. Any
controversy about Bayesian methods centres around the
explicit need to state the full set of prior information in
order to do any calculation. The framework provides no
guidance as to how to do this; instead physical insight
is needed to select suitable models for comparison with
data, and to assess their initial probability and the priors
on the model parameters in advance of that comparison.
Within a model, prior parameter ranges can be thought
of as plausible regions of parameter space that are acces-
sible to the model.
Bayes theorem can be thought of as a decomposition of
the final result into prior knowledge and the likelihoods
measuring the information coming from the data. In-
deed, the Bayesian formalism forces us to state explicitly
which part of the result is due to our assumptions, and
which part is driven by the data. The hope or expecta-
tion, both at the parameter level and model level, is that
data will be obtained of sufficient quality to overturn in-
correct prior hypotheses. If there is a broad range of
possible models, corresponding to different prior choices,
it will require more data to converge to a robust conclu-
sion. But in the Bayesian approach data will eventually
overcome prior choices; the wider the range of plausible
priors, the more data we can expect to need before a firm
conclusion can be drawn.
The Bayesian evidence sets up a tension between the
ability of a model to fit the data and the prior predictive-
ness of the model, in a quantitative implementation of
Occam’s razor. Note that that we prefer to use the term
‘predictiveness’ rather than ‘simplicity/complexity’; the
former is what is actually rewarded by the evidence, and
is not necessarily directly related to, for instance, the
number of parameters. The models that do best are the
ones that make specific predictions that later turn out to
fit the data well. Less predictive models, even if they can
fit the data as well, score more poorly. The Bayesian ev-
idence has been widely applied to cosmological problems
in recent years [3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
Some statistics have been extensively used as proxies
to the actual evidence, such as the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) [13, 14]. But unlike the evidence
these approximations are often biased, and by construc-
tion disfavour models with more parameters, even when
those parameters are not constrained by the data (see
IIIC for more on this in relation to the evidence, and
Ref. [14] for a discussion of the limitations of some infor-
mation criterion based approaches). Wherever possible
the full evidence should be used.
III. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT MODEL
SELECTION
The paper of Linder and Miquel [1] launches a pri-
marily rhetorical attack on the model selection frame-
work. We will argue here that the paper contains numer-
ous factually-incorrect statements. These appear largely
to be traceable to three fundamental misunderstandings
concerning the Bayesian framework and its applications,
which we now describe.
A. Model selection does not replace parameter
estimation. It extends it.
Linder and Miquel appear to believe that model selec-
tion and parameter estimation are competing techniques.
This is incorrect. As described above, model selection ex-
tends the Bayesian framework to the model level. Within
each model, parameter estimation is carried out in the
usual manner. This would include, as usual, goodness-
of-fit and data subset consistency checks.
Specifically, we see that parameter estimation corre-
sponds to model selection where the prior model proba-
bilities of all but one model have been set to zero. This
seems a regressive step; one can hardly claim that our
understanding of, for instance, dark energy is so good
that we should focus on only one possible description.
From this perspective, the need to choose model pri-
ors is clearly an advantage, not a drawback. Parameter
estimation corresponds to one particular choice of those
priors. By acknowledging that other choices are possi-
ble, a much more wide–ranging and robust investigation
of the possible outcomes of future experiments can be
made, as was done in Ref. [11].
A further advantage of model selection is that it al-
lows one to ask new types of question. As it subsumes
parameter estimation, one can obviously still ask about
parameter confidence ranges, for instance, either model-
by-model or via Bayesian model averaging as in Ref. [11].
But one can also ask whether entire models are excluded
by data at a given strength of evidence, based on their
posterior model probability, or whether data provide sup-
port for additional model parameters. Indeed, the cur-
rent leading questions in dark energy studies are of model
selection type, viz. is the equation of state w equal to
−1 or is it variable? In the latter case, is w constant or
time-varying? One can also compare models that are not
nested, for instance is quintessence a better description
of the data than a modified gravity model? Such ques-
tions are not accessible to parameter fitting analyses and
often cannot even be phrased in frequentist terms.
An important application of model selection is survey
forecasting and design, where one assesses or constructs
a survey in order to optimize the ability to answer a par-
ticular question or questions [4, 8, 12]. The details will
inevitably depend to some extent on prior assignments,
and it is of course important to vary these within reason-
able ranges. Model selection forecasting allows optimiza-
tion for a broader range of possible questions.
Linder and Miquel also claim that survey design based
on model selection is betting on the absence of structure
in the possible parameter space, apparently confusing the
space of possible ‘true’ models with the likelihood in that
space given a particular ‘true’ model. The opposite is
3true. By including several models, one can focus atten-
tion on particular regions of parameter space that are
especially well motivated, for instance ΛCDM, or the lo-
cations predicted by one-parameter quintessence models.
In fact it is parameter estimation that assumes that the
parameter space is a blank canvas in which each point is
of equal value.
B. Physical intuition and priors are the same thing!
Linder and Miquel criticize the Bayesian methodol-
ogy for giving results that are often dependent on prior
assumptions, and simultaneously claim that it seeks to
avoid, or even prevent, use of physical intuition. Appar-
ently they have not realised that physical intuition and
priors are the same thing! After all, where do the mod-
els come from that we decide to compare to the data?
What decides their prior model probabilities, and the
reasonable ranges for their parameters? This is where
the physics comes in. The mere fact that it can be diffi-
cult to put our physical intuition in quantitative terms by
selecting prior ranges and prior probabilities is no good
reason to give up the exercice.
The Bayesian model selection framework, by allow-
ing us to specify multiple models with both model and
parameter priors, maximizes our chance to incorporate
physical intuition into data analysis. Linder and Miquel’s
claims to the contrary hold no substance at all. From
this perspective, the prior dependence in Bayesian anal-
ysis should be viewed in a positive light, not a negative
one, as it allows different intuitions to be tested. Bayes’
theorem provides a convenient decomposition into the
parts of the conclusions that are data-driven (the pa-
rameter and model likelihoods) and those that are prior-
driven (the physical intuition), and so one can always
keep track of the balance between those two. As long
as the data cannot decide the issue, our physical intu-
ition influences the outcome of our conclusions, but in
the Bayesian framework we are made explicitly aware
of this situation through the need to specify an explicit
prior. There is no inference without assumptions. As the
amount and quality of data increases, the priors become
less important and the conclusions based on our expec-
tations are replaced by conclusions based on actual data.
This is how physics should work.
C. Model selection does not act against models
whose parameters cannot yet be measured.
Linder and Miquel give a historical overview, titled ‘re-
ality check’, which seeks to show by example that model
selection techniques, if applied in the past, would have
led researchers astray. In our view all of this section is
incorrect, as we explain in detail in the Appendix. Here
we will address the reason why Linder and Miquel have
gone astray.
Their main mistake is a failure to recognize the differ-
ence between two distinct circumstances. The first is a
situation where a phenomenon could have been discov-
ered, but wasn’t; this corresponds to a likelihood function
well localized within the prior of the relevant parame-
ter, but consistent with a zero value. Model selection
statistics act against models with the extra parameter
in that case (an example being spatial curvature). The
second is the situation where observations were of insuf-
ficient power to constrain the parameter, corresponding
to a flat or nearly flat likelihood across the prior. In this
case, the contribution of the parameter factorizes out of
the evidence integral, leaving it unchanged. Therefore
Bayesian model selection does not act against parameters
that are unconstrained by existing data (see Ref. [9] for
a detailed discussion). Comparisons of such models are
inconclusive, awaiting new data. All the examples they
give purporting to show model selection going astray are
actually in the second category, and not in the first as
they say.
Their misunderstanding can be partially traced to their
use of the BIC [13]. This model selection criterion as-
sumes that all parameters are well measured. If this is
not the case, then the BIC will exclude models that are
perfectly acceptable when using full Bayesian model com-
parison, as e.g. demonstrated in Ref. [7]. There it was
shown that the BIC rules out the “kink” parametrisa-
tion of the dark energy equation of state, in disagreement
with the full Bayesian evidence. Indeed, in the deriva-
tion of the BIC only the scaling with the number of data
points N was kept, while even in the idealized case of
linear models with Gaussian errors the overall scaling of
the log-evidence for a model with k parameters is rather
k ln(N/k) [9]. Additionally there is a term that depends
on the size of the error bars relative to the size of the
prior, which often dominates. For these reasons, the BIC
tends to give an unrealistically high penalty to extra pa-
rameters, compared to the full Bayesian evidence, if its
underlying assumptions are not met. Only the evidence
is a full implementation of Bayesian model comparison.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We regard model selection techniques as a powerful
tool for cosmologists, both for data analysis and for sur-
vey forecasting and design. They broaden the range of
questions one can ask of present and future observations,
and can be applied in a consistent and rigorous frame-
work. While there remains room for debate about the
relative merits of frequentist and Bayesian approaches in
cosmology, we believe that the many demonstrable flaws
of the Linder–Miquel paper prevent it from contributing
constructively to that debate.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED CRITIQUE
In this Appendix we provided a detailed critique of
some of points made by Linder and Miquel.
1. Linder and Miquel: Section III/V
In our view, the discussion in their section III, seeking
instances from history where model selection would have
misinformed, is entirely wrong or irrelevant. Since this
is the sole motivation for their Section V, it too has no
validity. We take their account paragraph by paragraph.
a) This paragraph claims that, pre-1998, model se-
lection would have dismissed the now-favoured ΛCDM
model. Absolutely not! Data before that epoch were un-
able to meaningfully constrain Λ. As discussed above,
the comparison would have been inconclusive. This is
in accord with the fact that in the 1990s papers typi-
cally considered several cosmological models, including
ΛCDM, on a roughly equal footing. In 1998 better data
came along able to rule out the critical-density and open
models, at which point model selection would correctly
pick out the dark energy model.
b) This paragraph mentions Feynman’s repackaging of
all equations of nature into U¯ = 0. We can see no rel-
evance in this point. Repackaging equations does not
change the number of model fit parameters, and hence
affects neither parameter estimation nor model selection.
c) This paragraph claims that before 1992 model se-
lection would have argued against structure in the cos-
mic microwave background (CMB), on the grounds that
Cℓ = 0 is simpler than independently specifying each Cℓ.
Absolutely not! This point confuses the data and the
models. No one has ever thought that a separate spec-
ification of each Cℓ was a model, and certainly not in
1992. Indeed, clearly the acceptable models of the time,
the CDM family with or without Λ, all predicted CMB
structures that were indeed subsequently seen. Not that
this has anything much to do with model selection; mod-
els cannot be rejected before obtaining data that actually
constrains them.
d) This paragraph notes that the galaxy two-point
correlation function was for many years thought to be
a power-law, without an underpinning physical model.
However, that the power-law model is no longer consid-
ered is irrelevant. Would any more physical model have
been wrongly ruled out by model selection, had they ex-
isted? No is the answer. When data improved, would
model selection support them over the power-law model?
Yes. As it should.
e) This paragraph makes a point about there being the
deeper physics of the halo model behind the matter power
spectrum, but this has nothing to do with cosmological
model selection.
f) This paragraph claims that the modern electro-weak
theory would have been rejected by model selection had it
existed contemporaneously with the Fermi theory during
its heyday. Absolutely not! Had the Glashow–Weinberg–
Salam model been around in say 1950, it would not have
been ruled out by model selection because all of its pa-
rameters were poorly constrained. Model selection would
have been unable to distinguish it from the simpler Fermi
model. Later on better data came along and ruled out
the simpler model. Just as it should.
g) This paragraph makes a point that seemingly com-
plex phenomenology may have a simple underlying struc-
ture, e.g. atomic spectra. There is some relevance to this
point, though a ‘complicated’ say two-parameter equa-
tion of state model for dark energy is unlikely to have a
substantially simpler ‘fundamental’ description. Never-
theless, if improved physical understanding comes along
and creates a compelling model of that type, then that is
the time to try out model selection statistics on it. Such
a model can hardly be ruled out before it even exists, nor
tested until its predictions are defined.
2. Linder and Miquel: Section IV
In Section IV the authors advocate a frequentist ‘rejec-
tion of null hypothesis’ test where ΛCDM is the null hy-
pothesis. This is done by simulating data only for ΛCDM
and drawing likelihood contours, with the viability of
ΛCDM then interpreted according to the position of ac-
tual measurements with respect to those contours. Note
that this approach seeks to rule out ΛCDM in favour of a
more general dark energy model without ever computing
the probability of the data under the latter model.
We first note that the quantity they compute and call
BIC is not the BIC. A giveaway is that they are claiming
that the lower likelihood models are preferred. The cor-
rect computation of the BIC requires simulation of data
at each point in the parameter space, and then a model
comparison test of ΛCDM versus the two-parameter dark
energy model at each point. We carried out exactly such
an analysis, computing the full evidence rather than the
BIC, in Ref. [8]. Linder and Miquel only simulate ΛCDM,
and then simply flip the sign of the relative log-likelihood,
which is not equivalent.
On top of the above flaw, Linder and Miquel’s argu-
ment then goes on to describe a situation in which a
frequentist analysis delivers a 90% confidence contour
5around the ΛCDM model (based on synthetic data) in
the (w0, wa) plane, and claims that a measurement ly-
ing outside that region would exclude the ΛCDM at the
90% confidence level. This is an incorrect statement in
frequentist statistics, as it slips in the wrong assump-
tion that the probability of the data given the hypothe-
sis (i.e., the frequentist confidence region) is the same as
the probability of the hypothesis given the data.1 The
latter quantity is undefined for a frequentist, for whom a
hypothesis is either true or false (although we might not
know which one is true) and a probabilistic statement
about it would be meaningless. For a Bayesian of course
the two are related through Bayes theorem.
Linder and Miquel also voice their discontent about
the BIC condition being stronger, i.e. making it harder to
rule out ΛCDM. But this is hardly surprising, being just
a manifestation of Lindley’s well-known ‘paradox’ [15]; as
summarized in Appendix A of Ref. [4] (see Figure A1),
in general frequentist significance tests do not agree with
Bayesian model selection, since the former ignore the in-
formation gained through the data. This is evident in
Figures 1 and 2 of Ref. [8], which is exactly the compar-
ison Linder and Miquel are trying to make. There is no
basis to claim, using a frequentist significance test, that
the BIC ‘spuriously rules out’ a particular set of models,
because there is no basis to take the frequentist result as
the ‘truth’. We could equally well say that model-level
Bayesian inference demonstrates that parameter estima-
tion ‘spuriously rules out ΛCDM’ in those circumstances.
It is true that model selection gives a larger param-
eter area in which ΛCDM would not be ruled out even
if it is wrong, though usually returning an inconclusive
verdict in that case, to be deferred to future data. The
trade-off is that parameter estimation techniques applied
for model comparison are much more likely to rule out
ΛCDM even if it is right (by not recognizing that the data
has lower probability under a less predictive model). One
cannot win on both sides of that coin.
Independently of the above misconceptions, Linder and
Miquel further claim that if ΛCDM results in a poor like-
lihood in light of new data, then it should be rejected in
favour of a more general (less predictive) model, i.e. one
in which w0 and wa vary freely over any range. It is
not clear for example why this model was chosen instead
of, for example, one where w(z) varies in 1000 redshift
bins, which would probably achieve an even better fit. In
the Bayesian framework we can admit all those models,
assigning a prior probability to each that reflects our rel-
ative degree of belief based on our understanding of the
1 To convince oneself of the difference between the two quantities,
imagine selecting a person at random — the person can either
be male or female (our hypothesis). If the person is female,
her probability of being pregnant (our data) is about 3%, i.e.
P (pregnant|female) = 0.03. However, if the person is pregnant,
her probability of being female is much larger than that, i.e.
P (female|pregnant)≫ 0.03. For further details, see Ref. [16].
physical processes at work. One then goes on to compute
the posterior probabilities for each of the models.
3. Linder and Miquel: Section II
We disagree with all statements in Section II of their
paper implying that parameter estimation and model se-
lection are distinct endeavours. In addition we note
1) The statement that we wouldn’t want to throw away
a tree containing one fit fruit is misleading. If the fit
fruit is a better fit that those on other trees, then the
goodness-of-fit will be rewarded by model selection. If it
is no fitter than those on smaller trees (and is everywhere
constrained meaningfully by data) then of course we do
want to throw away that tree: this is what Occam’s Ra-
zor is all about and without it we have no control over
arbitrarily complex models.
2) It is implied that model selection might disadvan-
tage fundamental models that might have apparently
complicated phenomenological manifestations. Specific
examples mentioned are braneworld models of modified
gravity and inverse power-law potentials. This criticism
is not true at all; people are welcome, indeed encour-
aged, to deploy fundamental parameters in model selec-
tion rather than phenomenological ones where possible.
4. Rhetoric
We end by pointing out that this paper uses the rhetor-
ical trick of attributing, without citation, and then re-
butting, some vaguely ridiculous assertions supposedly
held by model selection advocates. For instance, no-one
has suggested that model selection techniques should be
‘blindly applied’ without regard to physical insight, and
if they had it would have been a pretty ludicrous sugges-
tion. No one has claimed that parameter fitting is ‘mis-
guided’, it being a key part of the inference procedure,
though we have indeed argued that it is inadequate if one
wishes to answer questions phrased at the model level
(e.g. is quintessence a better description of data than
a particular modified gravity model). We are also un-
aware of any cases where ‘overenthusiastic application of
model selection led to some claims about the probability
of future experiments failing to see characteristics such
as dynamics that current data cannot access’, though we
may have been enthusiastic about being able to make
probabilistic forecasts under carefully-defined prior as-
sumptions [4, 10, 11, 12].
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